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Now a day Almost all of the country face the problem of the shortage of energy 
sources. It is more serious to China which have the most populations in the world. 
Research the problem of peak-load pricing of electric industry is more significance 
under this background. It is more important to the use of electric energy and to 
development of country. 
There are many models about peak-load pricing. We can dispatch those models 
into two parts, one is mathmatical model and the other is game model. We can also 
dispatch mathmatical models into two parts,one is classical peak-load pricing and the 
other is neoclassical peak-load Pricing. Basing on the classical Peak-Load Pricing and 
inducting the diverse product technology of neoclassical peak-load pricing we can 
build a new mathmatical model.we jion the probability of peak-load and the time 
proportion of peak-load.in the new mathmatical model. We can draw sets of important 
conclusion from the new mathmatical model: 
1. On peak-load the consumers need pay the marginal variable cost and the 
marginal capacity cost.  Off peak-load the consumers need pay the marginal variable 
cost and the marginal utilized capacity cost. We can see that no matter on or off 
peak-load or not, the consumers in all periods contribute toward the cost of capacity. 
This conclusion is correspond with the neoclassical peak-load model’s conclusion. 
We can point out the off peak-load cosumers contribute the marginal utilized capacity 
cost to fixed cost. 
2. For the cost decreasing industry with regulated profit in the long-run, we can 
draw a conclusion: On peak-load the price below the marginal variable cost add to the 
marginal capacity cost (general above below marginal ). Off peak-load the price 
below the marginal variable cost add to marginal utilized capacity cost. Whether the 
price below the marginal variable cost or not. The key thing is whether the last 













utilized capacity cost is zero, then the price will below the marginal capacity. If the 
last utilized capacity is use up, the the marginal utilized capacity cost above zero then 
the price will below the marginal variable cost add to marginal capacity cost. But, in 
general the price will above the marginal variable cost. This conclusion is different 
the Wenders’s conclusion which is the profit maximizing regulated electric utility 
may set peak price above marginal cost and off -peak price below marginal cost. 
3. Add the probability of peak-load to the new mathmatical moden ,we can drew 
a conclusion that the price of peak-load inverse the probability of the peak-load. The 
high the probability is the low price of the peak-load is and the low probability is the 
high price of the peak-load is.    
4. Add the time proportion of peak-load to the new mathmatical moden ,we can 
drew a conclusion that the time proportion peak-load inverse the time proportion of 
the peak-load. The high the time proportion is the low price of the peak-load is and 
the low time proportion is the high price of the peak-load is. 
After analyse the mathmatical model, this dissertation intrduce the newclassical 
peak-load pricing model and the game model of peak-load pricing. On the Auction 
model, this dissertation drew the same conclusion which is drewed in the new 
mathmatical model with some practice auction model. So it prove the correction of 
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① 胡向真、陈志华著. 电力工业发展模式研究[M]. 北京: 中国水利水电出版社, 2005: 3-14. 
② 根据 2005 年的《中国统计年鉴》，我国 2004 年的装机容量为 44000 万千瓦，用 13 亿人口平均得出人均
装机容量为 0.34 千瓦。 








































（1974）指出 Steiner 的价格歧视并不是传统意义上的价格歧视。 
 Williamson（1966）则从社会福利角度出发，详细地分析了实行高峰定价时
的社会福利变化情况，对高峰定价在固定比例的线性成本假设下进行了进一步的
                                                        












































                                                        
① 参见 Berlin、Cicchetti、Gillen 等学者的文献。Weintraub ①指出非高峰期的消费者是“搭便车者”，因为
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